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Psychotic disorders involving symptoms such as delusions have a lifetime prevalence of greater than 3% (Perala et 48 al., 2007) . Psychotic disorders are caused in part by genes (e.g., Gottesman, 1991; Timms et al, 2013) and are also 49 related to increased and dysregulated striatal dopamine (Howes & Kapur, 2009; Laruelle, 2003) . There is some 50 evidence that interventions given to people at imminent risk for psychosis might at least delay onset of the disorder 51 (Fusar-Poli et al., 2013). However, there is still uncertainty about how to effectively prevent psychosis in people at 52 risk and, despite the involvement of striatal dopamine in psychosis, medications that block striatal dopamine are not 53 recommended for the prevention of psychosis because of side effects (Fusar-Poli et al., 2013) . It is hoped that a 54 better understanding of the mechanisms involved in the development of psychosis might facilitate the development 55 of new interventions that can help effectively treat and prevent psychotic disorder. Magical thinking (i.e., unusual 56 forms of thought that are considered invalid by conventional standards; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Meehl, 1964 factor in psychosis, level of salience, could cause a decrease in level of magical thinking displayed on a behavioral 64 task in college students. 65
A leading theory about the development of psychosis is that it involves a state of aberrant salience. Aberrant salience 66 refers to the incorrect assignment of significance or importance to neutral stimuli and is thought to result from 67 increased striatal dopamine (Kapur, 2003) . Delusions are thought either to represent an attempt to explain aberrant 68 salience experiences or to be accepted as true because of aberrant salience regarding one's own thoughts. Part of 69 the rationale for the development of the aberrant salience hypothesis is the involvement of striatal dopamine in normal 70 incentive salience processes (e.g., Flagel et al., 2011) . In addition, the aberrant salience hypothesis seems consistent 71 with the types of experiences that people often report having right before the development of psychotic symptoms 72 (e.g., reporting a greater sense of significance to one's experiences; Bowers, 1973) . Further, a questionnaire 73 designed to reflect these aberrant salience experiences has been found to be strongly correlated with magical 74 thinking in college students (Cicero, Kerns, & McCarthy, 2010 ; Cicero, Becker, Martin, Docherty, & Kerns, 2013). 75 Furthermore, in an inpatient psychiatric sample, people with a history of psychotic disorder reported higher aberrant 76 salience on this questionnaire than people without a history of psychotic disorder. 77
Hence, there is some support for the aberrant salience hypothesis, but the evidence is correlational in nature. In 78 contrast, no previous study has examined whether experimental manipulations of salience cause changes in magical 79
thinking. In the current study, we examined whether an experimental manipulation that decreases salience would 80 result in a decrease in magical thinking displayed on a behavioral lab task. The salience manipulation involved 81 novelty, which previous research has consistently found is associated with increased perceived salience and 82 increased dopamine (e.g., Amso salience is the result of novel stimuli drawing attention (Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2008) , independent of perceived 85 reward value (Foley, Jangraw, Peck, & Gottlieb, 2014). We were uncertain about how large of an effect our salience 86 manipulation would have on the behavioral magical thinking lab task. Hence, to insure adequate power, we examined 87 our salience manipulation in a relatively large college student sample. 88
In the current research, we used a behavioral lab task to measure magical thinking rather than using more commonly 89 used questionnaire or interview measures. We did this for a couple of reasons. One reason is that we did not expect 90 the experimental manipulation to produce an effect on questionnaire measures of magical thinking that typically ask 91 about magical thinking that occurred in the past (e.g., "I have occasionally had the silly feeling that a TV or radio 92
broadcaster knew I was listening to him." Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999 However, a limitation of behavioral measures of magical thinking is their limited previous evidence of validity as 99 measures of magical thinking. In this research, we selected a promising recently developed behavioral measure of 100 magical thinking involving dart throwing (King et al., 2007) . In addition, we also examined the validity of this behavioral 101 magical thinking measure in two novel ways. First, we examined whether it was correlated with self-reported magical 102 thinking. Second, we examined whether it was correlated with a behavioral task that has been found to be sensitive 103 to striatal dopamine levels that, given the relationship between striatal dopamine and psychosis (Howes & Kapur, 104 2009), we therefore expected to be significantly associated with magical thinking. 105
Although our primary goal in designing this research was to be able to examine the effect of a salience manipulation 106 on magical thinking, we also included a putative manipulation of dopamine to examine whether it also caused a 107 change on the behavioral magical thinking task. Importantly, although dopamine is strongly associated with psychosis 108 (Howes & Kapur, 2009 ) and magical thinking predicts psychotic disorders (Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad, & 109 Zinser, 1994), to our knowledge there is no evidence associating dopamine with magical thinking. This is an important 110 issue because, although we expect magical thinking to be related to dopamine, it is possible that this is not the case. 111
Instead, it is possible that the mechanisms that contribute to magical thinking (and predict future psychosis) are 112 different from the mechanisms that directly produce psychotic symptoms in vulnerable individuals (e.g., it has been 113 suggested that there might be a complex causal chain with dysregulated dopamine being only the final step in 114 producing clinical psychosis; Laruelle, 2003; Murray, Lappin, & Di Forti, 2008) . We examined the relationship 115 between dopamine and magical thinking in two novel ways. First, we examined whether a putative dopamine 116 manipulation would cause an increase in magical thinking on a behavioral task. Second, we examined whether self-117 reported magical thinking was associated with performance on a task that has been previously found to be sensitive 118 to striatal dopamine levels (e.g., Cools Smith & Lenzenweger, 2007) . Hence, in the current study, we used a 126 putative dopamine manipulation, engaging in either a highly rewarding or a non-rewarding task, that based on 127 multiple previous studies should result in differences in striatal dopamine levels between these two conditions. We 128 examined whether our putative experimental manipulation of dopamine also caused a change in magical thinking on 129 a behavioral task. As a manipulation check, we also examined whether our putative dopamine manipulation resulted 130 in altered performance on a behavioral task previously found to be sensitive to striatal dopamine levels (Cools et al., 131 2006). Although we did not manipulate dopamine pharmacologically and we did not assess dopamine levels directly, 132 we still think examining the effect of this theoretically-driven putative dopamine manipulation, supported by multiple 133 previous studies that more directly assessed striatal dopamine levels, does add some useful novel data to help our 134 understanding of magical thinking. Furthermore, to highlight the fact that we did not directly manipulate or measure 135 dopamine, we will always refer to our manipulation as a "putative" dopamine manipulation. 136
Overall, the current study was a 2 (salience level: high versus low) by 2 (putative dopamine level: high versus low) 137 between-subjects design that for the first time examined the effects of a salience manipulation and a putative 138 dopamine manipulation on levels of magical thinking on a behavioral task in a large college student sample. We also 139 examined the validity of our magical thinking behavioral task by examining whether it was related to self-reported 140 magical thinking and to a behavioral task previously found to be sensitive to striatal dopamine levels. We also 141 examined a manipulation check of our putative dopamine manipulation by examining its effect on the behavioral task 142 previously found to be sensitive to striatal dopamine levels. Finally, we also for the first time examined whether self-143 reported magical thinking was associated with performance on this striatal dopamine-related behavioral task. 144
Methods

145
Participants
146
Participants were college students (n = 253) recruited from a large Midwestern public university who received credit 147 from an introduction to psychology course for their participation (56% female; mean age = 18. research were not paid for their performance). Participants were told that this part of the study concerned manual 157 dexterity at common tasks and that they would throw darts at a dart board. Participants were given six practice 158 throws. They were then told that to make the task more interesting that they would be throwing the darts at different 159 shapes. For all participants, the first shape was a smiley face in black ink. The image was tacked (at the corners) to 160 the dart board over the bull's eye. After throwing six darts at the smiley face, the experimenter then attached a second 161 "shape" to the dartboard, this time a photograph of a baby that was the same size as the smiley face. It has been 162 argued that being more inaccurate for the photograph of a baby than for the smiley face exhibits behavioral evidence 163 of the law of similarity, a form of magical thinking, or the idea that the photograph of a baby shares some fundamental 164
properties with a real baby (e.g., King et al., 2007; Rozin et al., 1986) . For each trial, the distance in inches between 165 the hole made by each dart and the target center (i.e., center of the image) was recorded by an experimenter who 166 was blind to both the hypotheses of the study and the condition of the participant. We computed a dart throwing 167 difference score (M = .29, SD = 1.18), which was the average distance in inches of the six darts for the baby image 168
Journal of Experimental Psychopathology, Volume # (201#), Issue #, 1-16 5 minus the average distance in inches of the six darts for the smiley face image. Hence, following King et al. (2007) , 169 greater magical thinking is indicated by a larger average distance from the center for the baby image than for the 170 smiley image. 171
Experimental Manipulations.
172
We examined the effects of a salience manipulation and of a putative dopamine manipulation on the behavioral 173 magical thinking Dart Throwing Task. Hence, before completing the Dart Throwing Task, participants completed 174 manipulations designed to vary salience and putative dopamine levels. 175
Salience Manipulation.
176
To manipulate salience in the Dart Throwing Task in the current study, we varied the novelty of stimuli. Viewing novel 177 images, as opposed to previously seen images, has been found to result in increases both in perceived salience and 178 in striatal dopamine (Amso et al., 2005 Task. In the low salience condition, participants threw darts at the image of the baby previously seen in the Image 192
Viewing Task. Since participants in the low salience condition had previously seen the image in the Dart Throwing 193
Task, it was presumably no longer a novel and salient image (Amso et al., 2005) . Thus, to the extent that participants 194 exhibit less accurate performance on the Dart Throwing Task for the novel than the previously seen condition, 195 participants are potentially implicitly associating more significance with an otherwise neutral stimulus (i.e., the novel 196 baby image), and are therefore exhibiting evidence of aberrant salience. Therefore, we expected that participants in 197 the low salience/previously seen image condition would exhibit less magical thinking on the Dart Throwing Task.  198 Participants were randomly assigned to either the low or high salience condition and the assignment of the particular 199 baby picture to condition was also randomized across participants. 200
Putative Dopamine Manipulation.
201
To putatively increase dopamine, some participants performed a gambling task involving a high level of reward. As 202 previously mentioned, there is evidence that performing behavioral tasks involving rewards, including tasks where 203 the goal is to win as many points as possible (i.e., as in video games), result in increased striatal dopamine (Abler et  204 to open as many boxes as they wished. They were told that nine of the boxes contained 'wins' while one box 208 contained a 'loss', with 'wins' meaning an increase in points (these points were specific to the game and were not 209 tied to monetary compensation). This loss box was randomly assigned to one of the 10 boxes in each trial. This loss 210
would make them lose all of their winnings for the current trial and end that trial. After each opened box, participants 211 had to decide whether to continue opening boxes to increase their winnings or terminate the trial to avoid a loss. 212
Since rewards increase striatal dopamine (Abler et al., 2009; Schultz, 1997) , to attempt to increase dopamine our 213 one modification to the task by Eisenegger and colleagues (2010) was to fix reward levels to ensure that each 214 participant performing the gambling task received a high number of rewards. Thus, unbeknownst to the participant, 215 the number of reward trials was fixed, so that participants won 50% of the first ten trials, 60% of the second set of 216 ten trials, 70% of the third set of ten trials, 80% of the fourth ten trials, and 90% of the last ten trials. The other 217 modification was that, for reward trials, a smiley face, a "+100" sign, and a positively-valenced high-pitched sound 218 were presented as feedback (instead of receiving a small monetary reward, as in Eigenegger et al., 2010). For 219 punishment trials, a sad face and a negatively-valenced low-pitched sound were presented as feedback, indicating 220 that participants had lost all points for the current trial (instead of losing the monetary earnings they had collected on 221 the current trial, as in Eisenegger et al., 2010) . During the task, participants also saw their total amount of points and 222 they were told that the goal was to accumulate as many points as possible. Therefore, participants in the high reward 223 condition completed a total of 50 gambling task trials involving frequent rewards. 224
In contrast to the putatively high dopamine gambling task, participants in the putatively low dopamine condition 225 performed a non-gambling syntactic judgment task modeled after the task used by Ni and colleagues (2000) . In this 226 task, participants were asked to judge whether a series of 60 sentences were grammatically correct. It was 227 determined through piloting that the time it took to grammatically judge 60 sentences was comparable to the time it 228 took to complete the gambling task. Sentences were presented one at a time on a computer screen and participants 229 judged whether or not the sentence was grammatically correct. We did not provide participants' with feedback 230 regarding their performance, in order to ensure that this was not a rewarding task, and therefore was appropriate as 231 a low reward/putatively low dopamine task. Thus, while this task still required that participants made choices (as in 232 the gambling task), these choices did not lead to reward. 1,2 233
Self-Reported Magical Thinking.
234
To validly and broadly assess self-reported magical thinking, participants completed three self-report measures of 235 magical thinking. 236
Magical Ideation Scale.
237
The first self-reported magical thinking measure was the Magical Ideation Scale (M = 8.91, SD = 4.94; Eckblad & 238 Chapman, 1983 ), a 30-item true-false questionnaire designed to measure "beliefs in forms of causation that by 239 conventional standards are invalid" (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983 , p. 215; e.g., "I have worried that people on other 240 planets may be influencing what happens on Earth." α in current study = .80). Previous research has found that high 241 scorers on the Magical Ideation Scale are at increased risk for future psychosis (Chapman et al., 1994) . Participants 242 also completed the Chapman Infrequency Scale ), a 13-item true-false questionnaire 243 designed to measure invalid or careless responding (e.g., "I have never talked to someone wearing eyeglasses"). 244
Following previous research, participants who answered "true" to three or more items (n=18) were excluded from the 245 analyses (Chmielewski, Fernandes, Yee, & Miller, 1995 item yes-or-no questionnaire designed to measure delusional ideation in a nonclinical population (e.g., "Do you ever 249 1 To examine whether the salience and dopamine manipulations simply affected how much people liked the faces of the baby images, following the Dart Throwing Task, participants were asked to report how much they liked each image (i.e., the smiley face and baby), as well as how much they liked throwing darts at each image, on a 10-point Likert scale (with 0 being not at all and 9 being extremely like). There were no significant differences (all p's > .20; all d's < .16) between the high and low salience, or the high and low putative dopamine, experimental conditions on either liking variable. 2 In addition to the Dart Throwing Task, we also included a second task that has been claimed to measure magical thinking, the Preference Ratings Task (Berenbaum, Boden, & Baker, 2009; Rozin et al., 1986 ). However, this task does not involve a behavioral measure but only relies on self-report of preferences (e.g., it is comparable to simply asking people on the Dart Throwing Task how much they want to throw the dart at a picture of a baby without actually measuring their behavioral performance). Hence, there are strong reasons to doubt whether this task is a behavioral measure of magical thinking. For the Preference Ratings Task, there was no effect of the salience or putative dopamine manipulations (effect sizes d = .00 and d = -.14, respectively), and the task was not significantly correlated with the Dart Throwing Task (r = .09). For the sake of brevity, we will not discuss this task further As expected, the three magical thinking self-report measures were all significantly correlated with each other (r's from 262 .43 to .57). Therefore, we created a latent variable from the variance shared between these three measures. In order 263
to create this latent variable, exploratory maximum likelihood factor analysis was conducted (Fabrigar et al., 1999) . 264
On the basis of this EFA, one factor was identified on the basis of examining the eigenvalues as well as the scree 265 plot (i.e., the first factor eignenvalue = 1.67, the second factor eigenvalue = .79, and the third factor eigenvalue = 266
.54). Factor scores for each participant obtained from this one factor were used in all further analyses. 267
Reversal Learning Task.
268
To provide a manipulation check for the putative dopamine manipulation and to test the validity of the behavioral 269 measure of magical thinking, participants completed a task thought to be related to striatal dopamine levels, the 270 Reversal Learning Task (Cools et al., 2009 ). In general, on reversal learning tasks, participants first learn that one 271 stimulus is rewarded and that a different second stimulus is punished. Subsequently, the associations with reward 272 and punishment are switched and participants have to learn that the first stimulus is now punished and that the 273 second stimulus is now rewarded, with this pattern repeating through a number of reversals. There are two trial types 274 that are most important for this task: (1) unexpected reward trials, where a stimulus that was previously associated 275 with punishment is now associated with reward; and (2) unexpected punishment trials, where a stimulus previously 276 associated with reward is now associated with punishment. It has been argued by Cools and colleagues (2009) that 277 heightened dopamine activity should facilitate a more rapid learning of stimulus-reward associations. In particular, 278
given its role in reward learning, it is thought that increased dopamine is associated with better reversal learning on 279 unexpected reward trials than on unexpected punishment trials. Consistent with this, recent imaging studies have 280 found that increased striatal dopamine is associated with improved performance on unexpected reward relative to 281 unexpected punishment trials on this Reversal Learning Task (Cools et al., 2009; van der Schaaf et al., 2012) and 282 that a manipulation that increased dopamine improved unexpected reward based learning relative to unexpected 283 punishment based learning on this task (Cools et al., 2009 ). Hence, we expected that better performance on 284 unexpected reward relative to unexpected punishment to be at least somewhat related to striatal dopamine levels. 285
In the current study, we used the same Reversal Learning Task used by Cools and colleagues (Cools et al., 2009 (questionnaires were completed last so that the questionnaire item content would not influence or in some way 302 "prime" the experimental manipulations and task performance). All measures and tasks were administered through 303 E-prime software (Psychology Software Tools, 2006). 304
Data Analysis Plan
305
In terms of data analysis, an ANOVA was conducted to analyze the effect of the salience and putative dopamine 306 manipulation on magical thinking. Then, correlations were conducted to examine the association between the 307 behavioral and self-report measures of magical thinking, as well as the relationship between self-reported magical 308 thinking and the Reversal Learning Task. An ANOVA was used to examine whether the putative dopamine 309 manipulation had an effect on Reversal Learning Task performance. An ANOVA was conducted to examine whether 310 the groups exhibited significant differences on current mood. Lastly, correlations were conducted to examine whether 311 the tasks were significantly associated with current mood. 312 this task was not significantly correlated with the Reversal Learning Task, r = .09, p = .22, and it was also not significantly associated with any other variable in this research. For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss this task further. 
Results
316
Effects of salience and putative dopamine manipulations.
317
We first examined whether performance on the behavioral magical thinking Dart Throwing Task was influenced by 318 experimental manipulations intended to vary salience and putative dopamine levels. As previously mentioned, larger 319 dart throwing difference scores were indicative of greater behavioral evidence of magical thinking. As can be seen in 320 Figure 1 , on the Dart Throwing Task, participants who received the low salience (i.e., previously seen image) 321 manipulation exhibited significantly less behavioral evidence of magical thinking than participants who received the 322 high salience (i.e., high novelty) manipulation, F (1, 231) = 4.43, p < .05, d = .27 (low salience: M = .14, SD = 1.00; 323 high salience: M = .44, SD = 1.35). Hence, it appeared that the low salience manipulation decreased magical thinking, 324 as participants were more accurate when throwing at the low salience, previously seen image than at the high 325 salience, novel image. 326
In addition, as can be seen in Figure 1 , for the Dart Throwing Task, participants who received the putative high 327 dopamine (i.e., high reward) manipulation exhibited significantly greater behavioral evidence of magical thinking than 328 participants who received the putative low dopamine manipulation, F (1, 231) = 15.38, p < .001, d = .50 (putative 329 high dopamine: M = .58, SD = 1.22; putative low dopamine: M = .01, SD = 1.08). Hence, in comparison to the putative 330 low dopamine group, the putative high dopamine group was significantly less accurate in throwing the dart at the 331 baby than at the smiley face. Note that the interaction between the salience and the putative dopamine manipulations 332 was not significant, F (1, 231) = 2.20, p = .14, d = .
333
Test of Validity of Magical Thinking Behavioral Measure.
334
Next, in order to examine the validity of the magical thinking behavioral measure, we examined the association 335 between behavioral and self-reported magical thinking. As expected, the behavioral magical thinking Dart Throwing 336 Task was significantly correlated with self-reported magical thinking (r = .21, p < .01). Next, we examined the 337 association between the behavioral magical thinking Dart Throwing Task and performance on the Reversal Learning 338
Task, a task previously found to be sensitive to striatal dopamine levels. The Dart Throwing Task was significantly 339 positively associated with performance on the Reversal Learning Task (r = .19, p < .01), indicating that better learning 340 from reward than from punishment was positively associated with greater evidence of magical thinking on the Dart 341 Throwing Task. Also, there were no significant differences between the groups on any of the questionnaires (all ps 342 > .12, ds < .23). Hence, the behavioral magical thinking measure was associated both with increased self-reported 343 magical thinking and with performance on a task associated with striatal dopamine. 344
Next we examined whether self-reported magical thinking was also associated with performance on the Reversal 345 Learning Task. Importantly, to our knowledge, no previous study has examined whether a measure of self-reported 346 magical thinking is associated with performance on a task sensitive to striatal dopamine. We found that self-reported 347 magical thinking was significantly correlated with the Reversal Learning Task, r = .15, p < .05. 348
Putative Dopamine Manipulation Check.
349
Thus far, we have reported that the putative dopamine experimental manipulation increased behavioral evidence of 350 magical thinking. Next, we examined a manipulation check of the putative dopamine manipulation, whether the 351 putative dopamine manipulation also influenced performance on the Reversal Learning Task that is sensitive to 352 striatal dopamine levels. As expected, participants who received the putative high dopamine manipulation exhibited 353 the expected pattern of performance on the Reversal Learning Task (i.e., better learning on unexpected reward trials 354 relative to unexpected punishment trials) to a greater extent than participants who received the putative low dopamine .13. In addition, we examined whether current mood was related to, and whether it could statistically account for 366 associations with, the behavioral measure of magical thinking. Negative mood was not significantly related to any of 367 the measures. Increased positive mood was significantly associated with increased behavioral evidence of magical 368 thinking on the Dart Throwing Task (r = .15, p < .05). However, after removing variance shared with positive mood, 369 the effects of both the salience and putative dopamine manipulations on the Dart Throwing Task and all previously 370 reported significant correlations with the Dart Throwing Task were still significant. 371
Discussion
372
The current study found a number of novel and potentially important results. For the first time, we found that a salience 373 manipulation caused decreased evidence of magical thinking on a behavioral magical thinking measure. In addition, 374
for the first time we found evidence that a behavioral manipulation that putatively affects striatal dopamine levels also 375 increases behavioral evidence of magical thinking. As a manipulation check, we also found that this putative 376 dopamine manipulation also altered performance on a task that has been found to be sensitive to striatal dopamine 377 levels. Moreover, for the first time, we found novel evidence for the validity of the Dart Throwing Task as a measure 378 of magical thinking, as it was associated with both self-reported magical thinking and with performance on a task that 379 has been found to be sensitive to striatal dopamine levels. Additionally, to our knowledge, this is the first time that 380 self-reported magical thinking has been found to be associated with performance on a task that has been found to 381 be sensitive to striatal dopamine levels. Hence, overall, the current results provide additional support for the 382 involvement of both salience and dopamine in magical thinking. 383
An important issue in our research is to what extent we can infer that our salience and putative dopamine 384 manipulations did in fact manipulate salience and dopamine. Potentially other plausible interpretations exist to explain 385 the effects of either the salience or putative dopamine manipulations on the behavioral magical thinking measure. 386
One potential interpretation is that for the salience manipulation the low salience condition involved seeing the critical 387 baby face stimulus more often than in the high salience condition, which potentially might result in people liking the 388 baby face more in the low salience condition (i.e., the mere exposure effect; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993 and there were no differences between the conditions. We also found no differences in current mood between the 392 conditions, making it less likely that current mood can account for our results. Another general issue that has been 393 raised is whether demand characteristics might vary by condition and could account for the effects of one or both of 394 the manipulations. Although in general this is possible, it is not clear why or how demand characteristics would vary 395 by condition (e.g., why would people in the putative high dopamine/high reward condition be more likely to think they 396
should not throw at the baby face and therefore be less accurate?). Another issue in this research is that we did not 397 directly manipulate dopamine or measure striatal dopamine levels. However, at the very least, our putative dopamine 398 manipulation is consistent with multiple previous studies that did more directly measure striatal dopamine functioning, 399 with previous research clearly supporting the view that our putative dopamine manipulation should increase striatal 400 dopamine levels (e.g., Koepp et al., 1998; O'Doherty et al., 2004 ). In addition, a possible limitation of the current 401 study is that our low putative dopamine manipulation involved performing a task that could potentially be viewed as 402 tedious, and therefore could have possibly affected performance on the behavioral magical thinking task. However, 403 it should be pointed out that this group was more accurate than the high putative dopamine manipulation. Hence, it 404 does not seem like performing the more tedious task made people in the low putative dopamine group less accurate. 405
In addition, although the current study employed an internally valid between-groups experimental design (e.g., 406 Campbell & Stanley, 1963), one limitation of the current study is that we did not measure magical thinking prior to 407 the manipulation. Overall, it is still potentially possible that there is another explanation for the effects of the salience 408 and putative dopamine manipulations on the behavioral magical thinking task. Nevertheless, without another 409 compelling plausible explanation, we think the most reasonable tentative interpretation of the manipulations is that 410 these manipulations involved salience and putatively dopamine. 411
Another issue in our research is whether the behavioral magical thinking task did in fact measure magical thinking. 412
In previous research, this task has clearly been identified as a magical thinking task on logical grounds (i.e., given 413 that it follows the magical "law of similarity" that similar things share fundamental properties, which in the case of the 414 Dart Throwing Task is not logically accurate; King et al., 2007; Rozin et al., 1986) . However, there has been no direct 415 empirical evidence in previous research supporting that this task involves magical thinking. In the current research, 416
we found that performance on this task was associated with self-reported magical thinking and with performance on 417 a task that has been found in previous research to be sensitive to striatal dopamine levels. Hence, for the first time, 418 the current study has provided empirical evidence supporting the validity of this task as a behavioral measure related 419 to magical thinking. Overall, we still think it is possible that performance on this behavioral task could be affected by 420 factors other than magical thinking. For example, it is possible that, given that anxiety symptoms are related to 421 magical thinking (Simonds, Demetre, & Read, 2009; West & Willner, 2011) , that anxiety symptoms could be 422 associated with behavioral magical thinking task performance, but the current study did not measure anxiety 423 symptoms. Future research should examine the relationship between anxiety symptoms and behavioral magical 424 thinking task performance. Also, we acknowledge that although the Reversal Learning Task has clearly been found 425 to be sensitive to striatal dopamine levels, performance on this task also involves other unknown factors and Dart 426
Throwing Task performance might be more strongly associated with those other factors rather than striatal dopamine. 427
It should be noted that although many of the significant correlations in the current study were in the expected direction, 428 the effect sizes for these correlations were also small. Nevertheless, based on the current research, our current best 429 tentative interpretation of the Dart Throwing Task is that it at least to some extent measures magical thinking. 430
Having discussed important potential limitations to the inferences that we can draw in the current research, we now 431 discuss what our results might mean for aberrant salience, dopamine, and behavioral measures of magical thinking. 432
Overall, we think the current study does generally support the aberrant salience hypothesis of psychosis (Kapur, 433 2003) . This hypothesis views psychotic delusions as the by-product of aberrant salience, as neutral stimuli are 434 inappropriately given importance and significance. For the first time, we experimentally manipulated salience levels 435 and found that the low salience condition exhibited lower levels of magical thinking on the behavioral measure. Given 436 that magical thinking predicts future delusions (e.g., Chapman et al., 1994), our results then are generally consistent 437 with the view that aberrant salience might also be important for delusions. Hence, the current research provides novel 438 experimental evidence supporting the aberrant salience hypothesis. Interestingly, our salience manipulation involved 439 decreasing salience as the original task involves seeing a highly salient and novel stimulus. Hence, the manipulation 440 we developed decreased novelty/salience by showing participants an image a number of times in the low salience 441 condition. Therefore, the current study suggests that decreasing salience to some extent can potentially decrease 442 magical thinking, which could be relevant for treatment development. However, a limitation of the current study is 443 that our salience manipulation was very specific to our particular behavioral measure of magical thinking and cannot 444 be directly generalized to other contexts. with psychoeducation about reasoning biases and teaches strategies for reducing these biases (Garety et al., 2014) . 456
In terms of aberrant salience, potentially a similar treatment could be developed in which aberrant salience is reduced 457 by providing explicit training to reappraise aberrant salience experiences. 458
In addition, the current research also found some novel evidence supporting the role of dopamine in magical thinking. 459
Dopamine is strongly associated with psychotic symptoms such as delusions (e.g., Howes & Kapur, 2009 ). However, 460 to our knowledge there has been no evidence that magical thinking, which predicts psychosis (Chapman et al., 1994) , 461 is also associated with dopamine. Given that dopamine has been viewed as potentially only the final part of a causal 462 chain that leads to psychosis (Laruelle, 2003; Murray et al., 2008) , it is possible that magical thinking may not 463 necessarily reflect dopamine dysregulation. However, in the current research, for the first time we found some 464 evidence linking magical thinking with dopamine, as a putative dopamine manipulation increased magical thinking 465 on a behavioral task and self-reported magical thinking was associated with performance on a task previously found 466 to be sensitive to striatal dopamine (i.e., the Reversal Learning Task; also note that the association between the 467 magical thinking behavioral task with the Reversal Learning Task also supports an association between magical 468 thinking with dopamine). The fact that the salience and putative dopamine manipulations did not interact potentially 469 could mean that the manipulations had an effect on magical thinking through different mechanisms. Conversely, it 470 could mean that these manipulations each influence the same mechanism but that their effects are additive (e.g., as 471 an analogy, two medications that both increase dopamine in an additive manner). Future research could examine 472 the effects of pharmacological dopamine manipulations on magical thinking and also attempt to more directly assess 473 the association between magical thinking and striatal dopamine functioning. 474 Again, the current research also found some novel evidence supporting the validity of the Dart Throwing Task as a 475 measure of magical thinking. This could be useful for research on magical thinking in multiple ways. First, given 476 limitations of self-report (e.g., Schwarz, 1999 
